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Fichte’s Deduction of the Moral Law
Owen Ware
Instead of enumerating in detail the advantages of such a deduction, it is enough 
to note that by means of it a science of morality first comes into being, and science, 
where it is possible, is an end in itself.
—Fichte, The System of Ethics (GA I/5:33, my translation)
It is often assumed that Fichte’s aim in Part I of the System of Ethics (1798) is 
to provide a deduction of the moral law, the very thing which Kant—after 
years of unsuccessful attempts—deemed impossible. On this familiar reading, 
what Kant eventually viewed as an underivable “fact” (Factum), the authority 
of the moral law, is what Fichte traces to its highest ground in what he calls 
the principle of the I as such.1 However, scholars have largely overlooked a 
passage in the System of Ethics where Fichte explicitly invokes Kant’s doctrine 
of the fact of reason with approval, claiming that consciousness of the moral 
law grounds our belief in freedom (GA I/5:65). On the reading I defend in 
this chapter, Fichte’s invocation of the Factum is consistent with Fichte’s 
grounding the moral law’s authority in the principle of the I when we distin-
guish (a) the feeling of moral compulsion from (b) the moral law itself. As we 
shall see, a failure to draw this distinction led one of Fichte’s nineteenth cen-
tury critics, Christfried Albert Thilo, to conclude that his deduction of the 
moral law is viciously circular.2 Although this objection misses its mark, it is 
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instructive for showing the extent to which Fichte remains committed to the 
fact of reason in grounding a science of morality.
Before we begin, a few caveats are in order. First, because I am limiting the 
scope of my discussion to the System of Ethics, I will not take it as a condition 
of success for my interpretation that it coheres with everything Fichte says 
during the so-called Jena period (1793–1800). One finds his views changing 
over these years, if only in presentation, and there is no reason to expect per-
fect continuity between them. Second, it is not my intention here to present 
a full comparison of Fichte’s project of moral justification to Kant’s, although 
the question of their affinity at times becomes unavoidable. Departing from 
the familiar reading, I will argue that Fichte embraces some version of Kant’s 
claim that consciousness of the moral law “discloses” our freedom to us (CPrR 
5:29–30), or what I will call the disclosure thesis. On my account, the real dif-
ference between their respective projects lies in Fichte’s claim that freedom 
and morality are not two thoughts but “one and the same thought” (GA 
I/5:64), or what I will call the identity thesis. Lastly, it is worth stating from the 
outset that my main concerns are interpretive, and I will not try to defend the 
plausibility of Fichte’s approach. But in a final section I will return to the 
objection that Fichte’s deduction is viciously circular, and there I shall explain 
why this objection is without merit.
 Normativity and the Science of Ethics
As a first step, it is important to understand why Fichte views his system of 
ethics, not as a self-standing theory, but as a theory “according to the princi-
ples of the Doctrine of Science” (nach den principien der Wissenschaftslehre). As 
he explains in the Introduction, both theoretical philosophy and practical 
philosophy share the task of explaining a relation of correspondence between 
what is “subjective” and what is “objective” (GA I/5:21). The difference 
between the two, Fichte adds, is that theoretical philosophy is the science of 
explaining how something objective corresponds to something subjective 
(how the world corresponds to the self ), whereas practical philosophy is the 
science of explaining how something subjective corresponds to something 
objective (how the self corresponds to the world). Simply stated, the claim of 
the Wissenschaftslehre is that these relations of correspondence are intelligible 
only if we assume a point of absolute unity between the two, a point where 
the subjective and the objective are “not at all distinguished from one another 
but are completely one [ganz Eins]” (GA I/5:21). This is what Fichte calls the 
“absolute identity of the subject and the object in the I,” or “I-hood” (Ichheit) 
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for short (GA I/5:21). I-hood therefore serves as the first principle of his sys-
tem as a whole, the single root from which particular theoretical and practical 
sciences can grow.
My reason for foregrounding this statement from the Introduction is that 
it sheds light on the relationship Fichte conceives between a deduction in 
general and the first principle of his system. In the first case, theoretical phi-
losophy can have success only if it recognizes that what we designate with the 
category of the objective—the feeling of necessity that comes with our repre-
sentation of the world—is nonetheless a representation. What we designate as 
objective is not a world given to us, but a consciousness of a world given to 
us—not a reality wholly independent of the I, but a consciousness of a reality 
wholly independent of the I. But that is just to say that without a link to the 
I, we lose all grounds to speak intelligibly about what is. Theoretical philoso-
phy is properly transcendental only when it treats what is objective as a form 
of “necessary thinking” that traces back to the first principle of I-hood (GA 
I/5:22). Similarly, Fichte argues, practical philosophy can have success only if 
it recognizes that what we designate with the category of the objective—the 
feeling of necessity that comes with our representation of duty—is nonethe-
less a representation. So what we designate as objective is not a command 
given to us, but a consciousness of a command given to us—not an authority 
wholly independent of the I, but a consciousness of authority wholly inde-
pendent of the I.3 But that is just to say that without a link to the I, we lose 
all grounds to speak intelligibly about what ought-to-be. Practical philosophy 
is properly transcendental only when it treats what is objective as a form of 
necessary thinking that traces back to the first principle of I-hood (GA I/5:28).
Although this gives us nothing more than a sketch, what I have said should 
help explain why Fichte introduces Part I of the System of Ethics with a piece 
of moral phenomenology:
It is claimed that a compulsion [Zunöthigung] expresses itself in the mind of a 
human being, a compulsion to act entirely apart from external ends, but abso-
lutely and simply to perform the action, and a compulsion to refrain from act-
ing, equally apart from external ends, but absolutely and simply to leave the 
action undone. Insofar as such a compulsion manifests itself in someone neces-
sarily, as surely as he is a human being, one calls this constitution the moral or 
ethical nature of a human being as such. (GA I/5:33)
What Fichte wants to highlight from the outset of the book is a particular 
feeling: the feeling of having to perform some actions, simply for the sake of 
performing them, and the feeling of having to avoid other actions, simply for 
11 Fichte’s Deduction of the Moral Law 
242
the sake of avoiding them. The issue at hand, then, is not yet the content of 
our moral obligations, but the way we experience them as binding, constrain-
ing, or limiting our activity. The fact (Thatsache) Fichte uses to set the stage for 
his deduction of the moral law is therefore the fact of normativity itself. It is 
an analogue of our representation of objectivity in the world, since we also 
experience the world as limiting us. And that is why the System of Ethics pro-
ceeds according to the principles of the Wissenschaftslehre. The aim of Part I is 
to trace our common consciousness of normativity to its higher (indeed high-
est) ground.
Of course, some of us may be content to treat this felt compulsion as a fact, 
without asking after its highest ground of possibility, and some of us may even 
decide to affirm it in an attitude of belief or faith (Glaube). This amounts to 
what Fichte calls factual or common cognition of our ethical nature, and he 
says quite explicitly that such cognition is all we need to cultivate “both a 
dutiful disposition and dutiful conduct” (GA I/5:34). The everyday phenom-
enology of moral compulsion indicates the presence of a practical imperative, 
and this imperative appears to be absolute (independent of extrinsic ends) and 
categorical (valid in all circumstances). Assenting to this appearance in an 
attitude of faith is sufficient for living a moral life, Fichte argues, because it 
grants this feeling priority over all other motives, desires, or inclinations that 
may call upon our attention. A deduction becomes pressing, then, only for 
someone who wants genetic or scientific cognition of our ethical nature. Such 
a person must “raise himself above the standpoint of ordinary consciousness” 
because he wants to know how this compulsion “originates” (GA I/5:34). Yet 
these two modes of cognition are not entirely separate. For Fichte, the kind of 
deduction appropriate to transcendental philosophy is one that vindicates the 
fact of normativity. Genetic cognition has the aim of uncovering the rational 
origin of this feeling in a way that defends, rather than deflates, our common 
moral consciousness.
But this raises an urgent question: How is such a defense possible? How are 
we to go about tracing the feeling of compulsion to its highest ground in the 
principle of I-hood? One obstacle standing in the way of such a deduction is 
that the principle of I-hood is, by Fichte’s own admission, unthinkable. It 
designates the “absolute identity of the subject and the object in the I,” but 
this identity, he is quick to point out, “can only be inferred” (GA I/5:21). In 
all cases consciousness requires a separation between what is subjective and 
what is objective: I am conscious of an object only insofar as I distinguish 
myself, as the one who is conscious, from the object of my consciousness—
even if that object is myself (GA I/5:21; cf. GA I/4:242). Consequently, we 
cannot become conscious of the point where the subject and the object are 
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one and the same, and so we cannot demonstrate the first principle of the 
entire Doctrine of Science as an “immediate” fact of consciousness. For this 
reason I think it would be a mistake to assume that Fichte wants us to employ 
the principle of I-hood in a conventional, unilinear manner and proceed step- 
by- step to the feeling of compulsion. But then what role, if any, is this first 
principle suited to play? If we cannot comprehend the unity of the I as such, 
prior to its separation into what is subjective and what is objective, how can 
we hope to acquire genetic cognition of our ethical nature, as Fichte seeks 
to provide?
 Fichte’s Deduction of the Moral Law
The answer brings us directly to what is most innovative about Fichte’s deduc-
tion: its three-part structure. The unthinkability of I-hood leads him to 
develop an unorthodox, multi-lateral strategy for deriving the feeling of com-
pulsion.4 In this connection an important hint comes to light when Fichte 
describes the “path” his deduction will follow:
We will assign ourselves the task of thinking of ourselves under a certain speci-
fied condition and observing how we are required to think of ourselves under 
this condition. From the property of ourselves that we find in this way, we will 
then derive, as something necessary, the moral compulsion noted earlier. 
(GA I/5:35)5
More specifically, the method Fichte employs in §§1–3 of Part I involves issu-
ing a task, seeking a solution, drawing a result, and then revealing a limit to that 
result, thereby motivating a new task6:
 1. Our task in §1 is to isolate what is most essential to the self, and Fichte’s 
solution is to approach the I under its objective aspect, as it is given in 
reflection (as willing). This leads him to the desired result: that what is 
most essential to the self is a tendency to self-activity. But the result is lim-
ited, since it does not show how we become conscious of this tendency 
(GA I/5:47).
 2. Our task in §2 is then to show how we become conscious of our tendency 
to self-activity, and Fichte’s solution is to approach the I anew under its 
subjective aspect, as it is engaged in reflection (as intelligence). This leads 
him to the desired result: that we become conscious of our tendency to 
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self-activity the moment we grasp our indeterminacy or lack of a pre-given 
nature (GA I/5:51).7
 3. However, Fichte tells us that this result is also limited. While it shows how 
we become conscious of our capacity to generate action from ourselves, it 
does not yet reveal a positive determination of this capacity (GA I/5:52). 
For this reason Fichte formulates a new task in §3, to show how we become 
conscious of our tendency to self-activity, not as a merely possible mode of 
willing, but as an actual mode of willing.The task of §3 marks a decisive 
turning point in the System of Ethics, leading Fichte to argue, rather strik-
ingly, that there is only one way our tendency to self-activity can manifest 
itself, namely, as a drive (Trieb), which he defines as “a real, inner explana-
tory ground of an actual self-activity” (GA I/5:55; cf. GA I/2:418). Fichte 
adds right away that, since the drive in question concerns our original self- 
activity, we must regard it as essential to the I as such, and here he offers an 
important remark: that this drive relates to the “entire I” (GA I/5:54). By 
this I take him to mean that when we consider an I divided by self- 
reflection, we now see that the I reflected upon is posited as a drive, that is, 
as an actual striving to self-activity, and that the I engaged in reflection is 
an intellect, which then subsumes this drive under a concept. The drive 
relates to the entire I, in other words, because it concerns both the I given 
in reflection and the I engaged in reflection, appearing first as a real ground 
of activity (objectively), and then as the very concept through which we 
direct our self-determination (subjectively) (GA I/5:56–57). But granting 
all this, we must still ask: How does the concept of a drive put us closer to 
the goal of solving the third task? What does this drive offer to conscious-
ness, if not the awareness of a mere capacity (Vermögen) to determine our-
selves freely?
Anticipating this question, Fichte explains that the drive to self-activity 
offers itself to consciousness as a thought (Gedanke) or manner of thinking 
(Denken), for the simple reason that it engages our power of intelligence.8 So 
it seems that all we must do in order to solve the task of §3 is to analyze this 
manner of thinking further, and that is what Fichte will soon recommend. 
But there is a problem at hand, as he is also ready to point out. The concept 
of a drive that relates to the entire I is precisely the concept of a drive that 
relates to the I as a subject–object unity, and Fichte reminds us once again that 
this unity is unthinkable (GA I/5:60). “The entire I is determined by the drive 
to absolute self-activity, and this determination is the thought we are consid-
ering. But the entire I cannot be grasped, and for this reason a determinacy of 
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the entire I cannot be grasped immediately either” (GA I/5:60). This means 
that if we are to analyze the manner of thinking manifesting from our drive to 
self-activity, we must take a multi-lateral approach—employing what Fichte 
now calls the “law of reciprocal interaction” (Gesetze der Wechselwirkung)—
whereby we isolate the manner of thinking first in its subjective and objective 
aspects, and then put the two together synthetically. “One can approximate 
the determinacy of the entire I,” he writes, “only by means of a reciprocal 
determination of what is subjective by what is objective, and vice versa, and 
this is the path we shall take” (GA I/5:60).9
 The Law for Freedom
Unfortunately, instead of moving directly to this path, Fichte raises the spec-
ter of an antinomy which, if left unresolved, would threaten the System of 
Ethics at its very foundation.10 The antinomy emerges from a possible objec-
tion one could level against the idea that a determinate thought or manner of 
thinking necessarily arises for the intellect. The problem is that, by Fichte’s 
stated definition, the intellect is supposed to be free, agile, and spontaneous—
the very characteristics that render it void of a pre-given nature—such that 
“no thoughts can ever be produced in it” (GA I/5:58). To say that a determi-
nate thought necessarily arises for the intellect therefore appears to commit us 
to a pair of contradictory claims: that our drive to self-activity produces a 
thought in the intellect (the thesis), and that the intellect is absolutely free 
from such production (the antithesis). But Fichte says that when the thesis is 
properly qualified, “we will see that both [assertions] can very well stand 
alongside each other” (GA I/5:58). In this respect he thinks that the way to 
dissolve the antinomy is to apply what he later calls the “rules of synthetic 
method,” whereby we resolve the contradiction between the thesis and the 
antithesis through a higher synthesis, “in such a way that the two would be 
posited as one and the same” (GA I/5:104).
On my interpretation, Fichte arrives at this synthesis by invoking the law 
of reciprocal interaction mentioned above. It unfolds over the course of 
three steps:
 1. In the first step, Fichte begins by inviting the reader to consider what is 
subjective in the manner of thinking arising from our drive to self-activity 
under the aspect of objectivity. The “essence” of objectivity, he explains, is 
what is fixed, unchangeable, and stable (GA I/5:60). So when we apply this 
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category to the manner of thinking in question, we get a command for the 
intellect to give itself a fixed law.
 2. In the second step, Fichte invites the reader to consider what is objective in 
the manner of thinking arising from our drive to self-activity under the 
aspect of subjectivity. The “essence” of subjectivity, he explains, is what is 
free, agile, and spontaneous (GA I/5:61). So when we apply this category 
to the law just derived, we get a command for the intellect to think of 
itself as free.
 3. In the third and final step, Fichte reminds us that we can approximate the 
unity of the two preceding thoughts “in accordance with the law of recip-
rocal interaction,” that is, “by thinking freedom as determining the law 
and the law as determining freedom” (GA I/5:64). When we then combine 
the objective aspect of the thought (that of the intellect giving itself a law) 
with the subjective aspect of the thought (that of the intellect thinking of 
itself as free), we get a command for the intellect to determine itself by its 
own law of freedom (GA I/5:64).As Fichte expresses this last point, speak-
ing now to the reader: “When you think of yourself as free, you are required 
to think your freedom under a law; and when you think of this law, you 
are required to think of yourself as free” (GA I/5:64). And the key point 
Fichte has been preparing us for is the insight that freedom and morality 
“are not two thoughts, one of which would depend on the other” but are 
really two aspects of “one and the same thought” (Ein und ebenderselbe 
Gedanke) (GA I/5:65)—or what I am calling the identity thesis. Once we 
establish this thesis, any tension between freedom and morality dissolves, 
and we can put the specter of an antinomy to rest. There is nothing con-
tradictory in the claim that our drive to self-activity produces a necessary 
manner of thinking—not when we see, having followed the course of 
Fichte’s deduction, that this manner of thinking is a law that the intellect 
gives to itself.
 The Higher Synthesis
But how does the identity thesis bring Fichte’s deduction to a close? Recall 
what he says at the beginning of Part I: that
we shall assign ourselves the task of thinking of ourselves under a certain speci-
fied condition and observing how we are required to think of ourselves under 
this condition. From the property of ourselves that we find in this way, we will 
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then derive, as something necessary, the moral compulsion noted earlier. 
(GA I/5:35)
The goal is to attain genetic cognition of our ethical nature, since we want to 
know where a shared feeling of “compulsion to act entirely apart from exter-
nal ends” comes from. And Fichte’s point is that a successful deduction must 
trace all such feelings back to the principle of I-hood. Yet the reason why he 
adopts a multi-lateral strategy, I have argued, is that the principle of I-hood is 
an unthinkable unity of what is subjective and what is objective. So the only 
way we can attain genetic cognition of our ethical nature is to apply a syn-
thetic method and reveal, through the law of reciprocal interaction, that we 
are required to think of ourselves under the law of our own freedom. Only 
then can we turn back to the “fact” Fichte introduced at the beginning of Part 
I. The necessity of thinking our freedom under a law (itself a mere aspect of 
the unity of the I) reveals the origin of the feeling of compulsion in ordinary 
moral life.
This completes Fichte’s deduction, which we may summarize11 as follows 
(Fig. 11.1):
Fig. 11.1 Fichte’s deduction of the moral law
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One advantage of this interpretation, if correct, is that it explains how we 
become conscious of our tendency to self-activity, not as a merely possible 
mode of willing, but as an actual mode of willing. Remember that what was 
missing from §2, and the reason why our analysis reached a limit, was that we 
only got as far as positing our capacity to act freely. This was important for 
illuminating the concept of freedom that we assign to the intellect: the free-
dom to produce action from itself. But this got us no further than the concept 
of an “empty, undetermined capacity of self-sufficiency” (GA I/5:63). “There 
lies in this concept,” Fichte explains, “not the least datum indicating that or 
what kind of actuality is to be thought” (GA I/5:63). As we discover, the 
“datum” by which we cognize ourselves as positively free only appears in §3, 
in the manner of thinking the intellect under its own law. For the law Fichte 
that introduces in this section arises from a real drive to self-activity, the 
expression of which is a command for the intellect to be free (i.e., to be abso-
lutely self-sufficient).
A related advantage of this interpretation is that it explains why, after con-
cluding his deduction, Fichte invokes Kant’s claim that consciousness of the 
moral law “discloses” our freedom to us (CPrR 5:29–30), or what I am calling 
the disclosure thesis. After saying that freedom and morality are “one and the 
same,” Fichte writes that in “many places Kant derives conviction in our free-
dom from consciousness of the moral law” (GA I/5:64), adding:
This is to be understood as follows. The appearance of freedom is an immediate 
fact of consciousness [unmittelbares Factum des Bewusstseyns], and by no means 
the consequence of another thought. However, as was recollected above, one 
could want to explain this appearance further and thereby change it into an illu-
sion. That one does not explain this appearance further—there is no theoretical 
reason for this, but there is a practical one: the firm decision to grant primacy to 
practical reason, to hold the moral law [das Sittengesetz] as the true and final 
vocation of one’s being, and not to go beyond the moral law through rational-
ization. (GA I/5:65)
As this passage makes clear, Fichte interprets Kant’s disclosure thesis approv-
ingly as a claim about the reason we have for assenting to the appearance of 
freedom. Our faith in this appearance can be derived, as he puts it, “from 
consciousness of the moral law” (GA I/5:65). In Kantian terms, this means 
that while freedom is the essence of the law, the law is the ground for cogniz-
ing freedom, for only the moral law reveals the positive determination of our 
tendency to self-activity.
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 Problems and Prospects
The textual evidence just reviewed makes it clear that there is, by Fichte’s 
lights, a close affinity between his deduction of the moral law and Kant’s dis-
closure thesis. However, what Kant actually says in the Critique of Practical 
Reason (1788) throws this affinity into question. After showing why freedom 
and morality “reciprocally imply each other” (CPrR 5:29), Kant asks where 
our “cognition of the unconditionally practical starts,” whether from freedom 
or from the law itself (CPrR 5:29). He then proceeds to eliminate both free-
dom (on the grounds that freedom is not an object of experience), and nature 
(on the grounds that nature only teaches us the rule of causal mechanism), 
concluding that it must be the moral law which first “leads” us to a positive 
concept of freedom (CPrR 5:29–30). Kant prepares the reader for this claim 
in the Preface, where he explains why freedom is the ratio essendi of the moral 
law and the moral law the ratio cognoscendi of freedom: “For had not the 
moral law already been distinctly thought in our reason, we should never 
consider ourselves justified in assuming such a thing as freedom (even though 
it is not self-contradictory). But were there no freedom, the moral law would 
not be encountered at all in ourselves” (CPrR 5:4n).12 While consciousness of 
the moral law is an underivable “fact of reason” (Factum der Vernunft), admit-
ting of no further proof, Kant argues that we can appeal to this fact to justify 
our belief in freedom (CPrR 5:31).13
In light of such remarks, it is perhaps not surprising that many commenta-
tors have come to assume that Fichte rejects the disclosure thesis outright. 
After all, from what we have discussed so far, Fichte seems committed to the 
project of deriving consciousness of the moral law, in the manner of a strict 
deduction, and so he seems committed to going beyond Kant, who was con-
tent (rightly or wrongly) to regard such consciousness as the ultimate bedrock 
of his moral philosophy. Yet, in hindsight, this makes Fichte’s reference to 
Kant at GA I/5:65 all the more enigmatic, since there he invokes the disclo-
sure thesis with approval. Nor has this enigma escaped the attention of Fichte’s 
critics: the passage at GA I/5:65 led one nineteenth-century reader—Christ-
fried Albert Thilo—to argue that Fichte’s invocation of Kant is out of tune 
with the entire aim and organization of his deduction.14 As Thilo sees things, 
instead of exposing the defect of presenting the moral law as a “fact of pure 
reason,” we find Fichte stopping at a Kantian position and asserting “against 
his will, as it were [gleichsame wider seinen Willen]” that “one has the moral 
law first and then freedom.” Thilo goes even further and argues that Fichte’s 
appeal to Kant undermines the cogency of his argument. For the apparent 
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aim of Part I is to deduce the moral law from the absolute freedom of the I; 
so, by now deriving this freedom from the moral law, Thilo alleges, “his 
deduction obviously turns in a circle and thus becomes superfluous [so dreht 
sich seine Deduction offenbar im Kreise und macht sich damit überflüssig].” 15
By way of reply, I want to suggest that Fichte’s invocation of Kant is much 
less mysterious when we place it in the larger context of the book. To start 
with, we may recall that the task Fichte issued in §2, and then reissued in §3, 
was to show how we can become conscious of our tendency to self-activity 
(GA I/5:53). The reason why our analysis in §2 reached a limit was that it 
only gave us insight into our capacity for free action, and a capacity remains 
problematic without any “datum” pointing to its actuality. By shifting atten-
tion to the I as a subject–object unity in §3, Fichte was able to articulate this 
datum in terms of giving ourselves a fixed law, an insight which, he argued, we 
attain when we frame our capacity for free action under the aspect of objectiv-
ity. What this shows, in my view, is that behind Fichte’s claim that the unity 
of the I is unthinkable, he remains committed to the epistemic primacy of the 
moral law for specifying the essence of self-sufficiency.16 For like Kant, he 
thinks that the sole datum of the actuality of freedom comes from our aware-
ness of a law to legislate ourselves. In this way Fichte combines—consistently, 
I would add—both the idea that freedom and morality are mutually interre-
lated aspects of the same thing (the identity thesis) and the idea that the moral 
law is the sole medium through which our consciousness of freedom becomes 
determinate (the disclosure thesis).
This is not to say that commentators have been entirely wrong to detect 
differences between Fichte’s strategy of moral justification and Kant’s, but I 
fear that they have not correctly identified the root of those differences. While 
Fichte accepts some version of the disclosure thesis, I read him as tacitly reject-
ing Kant’s view that freedom and morality stand in a relation of mutual con-
ceptual entailment, for this assumes that freedom and morality are distinct 
thoughts sharing content and extension—the two criteria for analytic reci-
procity.17 While Fichte is willing to follow Kant in identifying the moral law 
as the epistemic ground of freedom, he is not willing to accept what some 
scholars call Kant’s reciprocity thesis,18 because on his account we are not even 
dealing with an entailment relation here. On Fichte’s account, freedom (in the 
sense of sheer spontaneity) and morality (in the sense of legislation according 
to the concept of self-sufficiency) form a real synthetic whole, whose separa-
tion into subjective and objective parts is merely a product of abstract think-
ing. The method Fichte employs draws upon a law of reciprocal interaction in 
order to approach the unthinkable unity of the I.  It is for this reason that 
Fichte offers a multilateral deduction in Part I of the System of Ethics, whose 
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final result is that freedom and morality are reciprocal aspects of a sin-
gle thought.
But what are we to make Thilo’s allegation that Fichte’s deduction moves in 
a vicious circle? No one will deny that it is problematic to treat the moral law 
first as something to be argued for, and then use it as a basis to be argued 
from—since the first strategy regards the moral law as a conclusion, whereas 
the second strategy regards it as a presupposition. However, I do not think 
Fichte is guilty of committing this fallacy, and it is instructive to see why. Part 
I has both a moral starting point and moral terminus, but what many com-
mentators overlook is that the two are distinct from each other. The starting 
point is our everyday moral phenomenology, or what Fichte calls:
Moral Compulsion: The feeling of having to perform some actions, simply for 
the sake of performing them, and the feeling of having to avoid other actions, 
simply for the sake of avoiding them.
By the end of Part I we are supposed to have acquired genetic cognition of this 
phenomenon, whereby we see it as the manifestation of a necessary mode of 
thinking our freedom under law—the ground of which we only apprehend, 
Fichte argues, from a philosophical point of view. The principle underlying 
the feeling of moral compulsion is what Fichte formulates as the moral law 
(das Sittengesetz):
Moral Law: The law the intellect gives to itself—namely, to determine its free-
dom in accordance with the concept of self-sufficiency without exception.
This shows us that both the “fact” at the starting point of the deduction, and 
the “ground” of this fact at the terminus, are different ways of approaching 
moral normativity as such.19 The difference is therefore explanatory: the start-
ing point considers moral normativity from the viewpoint of ordinary con-
sciousness, whereas the terminus considers it from the viewpoint of 
transcendental reflection. In this regard Fichte’s deduction aspires to be inter-
nally self-grounding, since it does not seek to justify our experience of moral 
compulsion on the basis of morally-neutral or theoretical premises. Indeed, 
Fichte even warns the reader against “being misled—as has so often been the 
case—into wanting to provide a further explanation of our consciousness of 
having duties (for this is what the thought to be described will prove to be) 
and wanting to derive it from grounds outside of itself, which is impossible 
and which would violate the dignity and absoluteness of the law” (GA I/5:60).
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When Fichte then says in agreement with Kant that conviction in our free-
dom comes from consciousness of the moral law, he is not guilty of arguing in 
a vicious circle. If we pause to reread the stretch of text I quoted above, it is 
clear that he is drawing upon the moral law (the terminus), and not the feel-
ing of moral compulsion (the starting point), in an effort to justify our belief 
in absolute self-activity. Nor is there any inconsistency in this claim, since 
Fichte has already shown that morality and freedom are but two aspects of 
one and the same thought, viewed either objectively as a fixed law or subjec-
tively as sheer spontaneity.20 The moral law demands that we legislate our-
selves according to the concept of self-sufficiency without exception. And this 
is just the objective manner of thinking our own freedom, which otherwise 
appears to us as a fact of consciousness. When the question then becomes, 
“On what basis should we should assent to this appearance?” it makes sense 
for Fichte to invoke the moral law, since this law is the datum for the positive 
determination of our freedom. That is why, if “one does not go beyond the 
moral law, then one also does not go beyond the appearance of freedom, 
which thereby becomes for us the truth” (GA I/5:65). The moral law in this 
way supports a fundamental decision for Fichte—one which his “entire phi-
losophy is built upon” (GA I/5:43)—the decision to say, “I am free,” and not 
merely, “I appear to myself to be free” (GA I/5:65).
 Conclusion: The Science of Ethics
Whenever interpreting a philosophical argument, it is important to ask what 
it ultimately aims to accomplish. On the reading I have defended in this chap-
ter, Fichte’s deduction of the moral law seeks to trace our feeling of moral 
compulsion (as a “fact of consciousness”) to its highest ground, and the argu-
ment culminates in his thesis that morality and freedom are but two aspects 
of the I as such, considered either objectively or subjectively. For all its com-
plexity, then, the goal of Fichte’s deduction is simply to vindicate our com-
mon consciousness of moral normativity by revealing its rational source. It 
aims at nothing more than knowledge of our ethical nature,21 and Fichte is 
clear that knowledge is not power (Kraft):
In this way, while we gain insight into the grounds [of this compulsion] by 
means of a deduction, we do not gain any power to change this compulsion, 
because it is our knowledge, not our power, that reaches this far, and because the 
whole relation is necessary—it is our own unchangeable nature itself. The 
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deduction therefore produces nothing more than theoretical cognition, and one 
must not expect anything more from it. (GA I/5:33)
At the same time, theoretical cognition of our ethical nature is not a small or 
insignificant achievement. For it is precisely this cognition that links the doc-
trine of ethics (Sittenlehre) to the doctrine of science (Wissenschaftslehre) and 
thereby brings a science of morality into being—“and science, wherever it is 
possible, is an end in itself ” (GA I/5:33).22
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